

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
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WASHINGTON 22

July 25, 1973



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FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER BO

TO: AMBASSADOR BRUCE

Many thanks for your thoughtful comments and recommended changes in the note on Cambodia.

We incorporated all your suggested changes into the note, and (see below-)
passed it to Han Hsu yesterday. He accepted it without comment.

Today we will call Han in again to propose that my visit take place

September 12-15, or, alternatively, September 6 - 9.

(Quote attached)
Warm regards.

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

DOS Review Completed.

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*Passed to HAK
Surrender of
July 24, 1973*

The US side has consistently sought a ceasefire and political settlement in Cambodia since the January 27 Paris Agreement. The other side has continually refused to end the war in Cambodia and responded to the unilateral ceasefire proclaimed by the Phnom Penh government and the cessation of US air actions in Cambodia in February with an intensified military offensive.

The Chinese side declared to the US side in its message of June 4 that it would communicate the US peace proposal of May 27 to Prince Sihanouk. This proposal accepted a long-standing Chinese suggestion for direct talks with Prince Sihanouk made during every visit by Dr. Kissinger to Peking. The contents of the June 4 message were reiterated on June 13 by Foreign Minister Chi P'eng-fei and again in the Chinese message of July 6, that this awaited only the return of Prince Sihanouk from his travels. On July 6, Ambassador Huang Chen declared that the Chinese side would convey the US proposal to Prince Sihanouk now that he had returned to Peking.

The Chinese message of July 18 has therefore been noted with astonishment. There has been no change in US policy and no increase in US activities. In light of these earlier assurances, and the principles and spirit of the Shanghai Communique, it is difficult to understand why the Chinese side is unable to communicate an American peace proposal to a leader located in Peking. It is utterly unreasonable that this leader

- 2 -

should publicly demand that communications to him go through Mauritania to which the Chinese side would not entrust the original US communication of May 27. This raises special difficulties because in reliance on the June 4 note and subsequent assurances, the US had not engaged in any other negotiations or responded to any other channels.

As to the substance of the Chinese note of July 18, the Chinese side will not be surprised that the US side rejects a "solution" so arbitrarily weighted against it. This is inconsistent with the requirements of reciprocity and equality. It is beyond the bounds of logic to be asked to negotiate on an issue when the other side, clearly and from the outset, leaves no room for negotiations. In such circumstances the US side will leave negotiations to the Cambodian parties.